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RATIONAL INATTENTION DYNAMICS: INERTIA AND DELAY IN
DECISION-MAKING
BY JAKUB STEINER, COLIN STEWART, AND FILIP MATEˇJKA1
We solve a general class of dynamic rational inattention problems in which an agent
repeatedly acquires costly information about an evolving state and selects actions. The
solution resembles the choice rule in a dynamic logit model, but it is biased toward
an optimal default rule that is independent of the realized state. The model provides
the same fit to choice data as dynamic logit, but, because of the bias, yields different
counterfactual predictions. We apply the general solution to the study of (i) the status
quo bias; (ii) inertia in actions leading to lagged adjustments to shocks; and (iii) the
tradeoff between accuracy and delay in decision-making.
KEYWORDS: Rational inattention, stochastic choice, dynamic logit, information ac-
quisition.
1. INTRODUCTION
TIMING OF INFORMATION PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE in a variety of economic settings.
Delays in learning contribute to lags in adjustment of macroeconomic variables, in adop-
tion of new technologies, and in adaptation of prices in financial markets. The speed of
information processing is a crucial determinant of response times in psychological exper-
iments. In each of these cases, timing is shaped in large part by individuals’ efforts to
acquire information.
We study a general dynamic decision problem in which an agent chooses what and how
much information to acquire, as well as when to acquire it. In each period, the agent can
choose an arbitrary signal about a payoff-relevant state of the world before taking an
action. At the end of each period, she observes a costless signal that may depend on her
action choice; for example, she may observe her realized flow payoff. The state follows
an arbitrary stochastic process, and the agent’s flow payoff is a function of the histories
of actions and states. Following Sims (2003), the agent pays a cost to acquire information
that is proportional to the reduction in her uncertainty as measured by the entropy of
her beliefs. We characterize the stochastic behavior that maximizes the sum of the agent’s
expected discounted utilities less the cost of the information she acquires.
We find that the optimal choice rule coincides with dynamic logit behavior (Rust
(1987)) with respect to payoffs that differ from the agent’s true payoffs by an endogenous
additive term.2 This additional term, which we refer to as a “predisposition,” depends
on the history of actions but does not depend directly on the history of states. Relative
to dynamic logit behavior with the agent’s true payoffs, the predisposition increases the
relative payoffs associated with actions that are chosen with high probability on average
across all states given the agent’s information at the corresponding time.
If states are positively serially correlated, the influence of predispositions can resemble
switching costs; because learning whether the state has changed is costly, the agent relies
1We thank Victor Aguirregabiria, Mehmet Ekmekci, Šteˇpán Jurajda, Jakub Kastl, Philipp Kircher, Alessan-
dro Pavan, Marcin Pe˛ski, Vasiliki Skreta, Balázs Szentes, three anonymous referees, and participants in var-
ious seminars and conferences for their comments. Maxim Goryunov provided excellent research assistance.
Steiner was supported by the Purkyneˇ fellowship of the Czech Academy of Sciences and by GACˇR Grants
13-34759S and 16-00703S. Stewart is grateful to SSHRC for financial support of this research.
2This result extends the static logit result of Mateˇjka and McKay (2015) to the dynamic setting.
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in part on her past behavior to inform her current decision, and is therefore predisposed
toward repeating her previous action.
Our results provide a new foundation for the use of dynamic logit in empirical research
with an important caveat: the presence of predispositions affects counterfactual extrapo-
lation of behavior based on identification of utility parameters. An econometrician apply-
ing standard dynamic logit techniques to the agent in our model would correctly predict
her behavior in repetitions of the same dynamic decision problem. However, problems
involving different payoffs or distributions of states typically lead to different predispo-
sitions, which must be accounted for in the extrapolation exercise. The difference arises
because the standard approach takes switching costs as fixed when other payoffs vary,
whereas the predispositions in our model vary as parameters of the environment change.
A major difficulty in solving the model and obtaining the dynamic logit characteriza-
tion arises due to the influence of current information acquisition on future beliefs. One
approach would be to reduce the problem to a collection of static problems using the
Bellman equation, with payoffs equal to current payoffs plus continuation values that de-
pend on posterior beliefs. However, the resulting collection of problems cannot be solved
by directly applying techniques developed for static rational inattention problems (hence-
forth, RI problems). In static RI problems, not including information costs, expected pay-
offs are linear in beliefs; in the Bellman equation, continuation values are not linear in
probabilities. Nevertheless, we show that the solution can be obtained in a similar fashion
by ignoring the effect of information acquisition on future beliefs: one can define contin-
uation values as a function only of the histories of actions, costless signals, and states, and
treat those values as fixed when optimizing at each history. Because of this property, we
can characterize the solution to the dynamic RI problem in terms of solutions to static RI
problems that are well understood.
The key step behind the reduction to static problems is to show that the dynamic RI
problem can be reformulated as a control problem with observable states. In this refor-
mulation, the agent first chooses a default choice rule that specifies a distribution of ac-
tions at each history independent of which states are realized. Then, after observing the
realized state in each period, she chooses her actual distribution of actions, and incurs a
cost according to how much she deviates from the default choice rule.3 Because states are
observable in the control problem, beliefs do not depend on choice behavior; as a result,
this reformulation circumvents the main difficulty in the original problem of accounting
for the effect of the current strategy on future beliefs.
We illustrate the general solution in three applications. In the first, the agent seeks to
match her action to the state in each of two periods. We show that positive correlation
between the states can lead to an apparent status quo bias: the agent never switches her
action from one period to the next, and her choice is, on average, better in the first period
than in the second. The correlation between the states creates a relatively strong incen-
tive to learn in the first period because the information she obtains will be useful in both
periods. Acquiring more information in the first period in turn reduces the agent’s incen-
tive to acquire information in the second, making her more inclined to choose the same
action.4
Our second application extends the first one to a stationary, infinite-horizon setting.
A binary state follows a Markov chain. The agent chooses a binary action in each period
3Mattsson and Weibull (2002) studied essentially the same problem for a fixed default rule in a static setting.
4As in Baliga and Ely (2011), the agent’s second-period beliefs are directly linked to her earlier decision,
although the effect here arises due to costly information acquisition rather than forgetting.
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with the goal of matching the state. This model can be viewed, for instance, as capturing
an investor’s choice between two asset classes, or a consumer’s choice between two prod-
ucts. Unlike analogous models with exogenous information or restrictions on available
signals, long-run behavior satisfies a simple Markov property: choice probabilities in each
period depend only on the action in the preceding period and the current state. Inertia
in states is reflected by inertia in actions. Provision of costless information, although ben-
eficial for the agent’s payoff, can have a perverse effect on behavior: relative to the case
in which all information is costly, additional costless signals can make the agent’s actions
less likely to match the state. The expectation of free signals in the future crowds out the
agent’s incentive to acquire costly information, in some cases to the extent that the overall
precision of information declines.
The final application concerns a classic question in psychology, namely, the relationship
between response times and accuracy of decisions. The state is binary and fixed over time.
The agent chooses when to take one of two actions with the goal of matching her action
to the state. Delaying is costly, but gives her the opportunity to acquire more information.
We focus on a variant of the model in which the cost of information is replaced with a
capacity constraint on how much information she can acquire in each period. The solution
of the problem gives the joint distribution of the decision time, the state, and the chosen
action. We find that, for a range of delay costs, the probability of choosing the correct
action is constant over time, and so is the hazard rate at which decisions are made (up
until the final period). In addition, the expected delay time is non-monotone in the agent’s
capacity, with intermediate levels being associated with the longest delays.
We focus throughout the paper on information costs that are proportional to the re-
duction in entropy of beliefs. There are two related reasons for this choice. The first is
tractability. Since the agent in our model can choose any signal in each period, the set
of possible information acquisition strategies is very large. With entropy-based costs, we
show that one can restrict attention to strategies that associate at most one signal realiza-
tion to each action (and hence each action history is associated with just one belief). This
substantially reduces the dimensionality of the problem in that it permits direct optimiza-
tion over distributions of actions without explicitly considering all information acquisition
strategies.5 Entropy-based costs are also important for the reformulation of the dynamic
RI problem as a control problem with observable states.
The second reason for using this cost function is that it abstracts from incentives to
smooth or bunch information acquisition because of the shape of the cost function. In
a problem involving a one-time action choice, the cost function we use has the feature
that the number of opportunities to acquire information before the choice of action is
irrelevant: the cost of multiple signals spread over many periods is identical to the cost
of a single signal conveying the same information (Hobson (1969)). Similarly, in dynamic
contexts, it makes no difference whether there are multiple opportunities to acquire in-
formation between action choices or just one; in this sense, preferences over the timing of
information acquisition across periods are driven by the payoffs in the decision problem
(together with discounting of costs). Although varying the shape of the cost function could
generate interesting and significant effects, our goal is to first understand the problem in
which we abstract away from these issues.6
5In the static case, this one-to-one association of actions and signals holds under much weaker conditions
on the cost function; see the discussion in Section 2.1.
6Moscarini and Smith (2001) focused on information costs that are convex in the volume of information
and studied delay in decision-making resulting from the incentive to smooth information acquisition over time.
Sundaresan and Turban (2014) studied a different model with a similar incentive.
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This paper fits into the RI literature. This literature originated in the study of macroeco-
nomic adjustment processes (Sims (1998, 2003)). More recently, Mac´kowiak and Wieder-
holt (2009, 2015), Mac´kowiak, Mateˇjka, and Wiederholt (2016), and Mateˇjka (2016) stud-
ied sluggish adjustment in dynamic RI models. Luo (2008) and Tutino (2013) considered
dynamic consumption problems with RI. Each of these papers focuses either on an en-
vironment involving linear-quadratic payoffs and Gaussian shocks or on numerical solu-
tions. A notable exception is Ravid (2014), who analyzed a class of RI stopping problems
motivated by dynamic bargaining. In general static RI problems, Mateˇjka and McKay
(2015) showed that the solution generates static logit behavior with an endogenous pay-
off bias. Our dynamic extension of this result links it back to the original motivation for
the RI literature.
Although optimal behavior in our model fits the dynamic logit framework, the foun-
dation is quite different from that of Rust (1987). He derived the dynamic logit rule in a
complete information model with i.i.d. taste shocks that are unobservable to the econome-
trician. Our model has no such shocks and focuses on the agent’s information acquisition.
This difference accounts for the additional payoff term in our dynamic logit result.
While information acquisition dynamics appear to be central to many economic prob-
lems, they are rarely modeled explicitly in settings with repeated action choices. Excep-
tions outside of the RI literature include Compte and Jehiel (2007), who studied informa-
tion acquisition in sequential auctions, and Liu (2011), who considered information ac-
quisition in a reputation model. In both cases, players acquire information at most once,
in the former because information is fully revealing and in the latter because the play-
ers are short-lived. Their focus was on strategic effects, whereas we study single-agent
problems with repeated information acquisition. In a single-agent setting, Moscarini and
Smith (2001) analyzed a model of optimal experimentation with explicit information costs
of learning about a fixed state of the world.
As described above, a key step in proving our results is to reformulate the problem
as a control problem. This reformulation connects logit behavior in RI to that found by
Mattsson and Weibull (2002), who solved a problem with observable states in which the
agent pays an entropy-based control cost for deviating from an exogenous default action
distribution. We show that, in both static and dynamic settings, each RI problem is equiv-
alent to a two-stage optimization problem that combines Mattsson and Weibull’s control
problem with optimization of the default distribution. Like us, Fudenberg and Strzalecki
(2015) derived dynamic logit choice as a solution to a control problem. They focused on
preferences over flexibility, while we focus on incomplete information and optimization
of the default choice rule.
2. MODEL
A single agent chooses an action at from a finite set A in each period t = 12    .7
A payoff-relevant state θt is drawn in each period t from a finite set Θt according to a
probability measure π ∈ Δ(∏t Θt). Let Θt = ∏τ≤t Θτ, and, for any sequence (bτ)τ, let
bt = (b1     bt) for each t. Before choosing an action in any period t, the agent can
acquire costly information about the history of states, θt . There is a fixed signal space
7Although the action set is constant across time, the model can implicitly allow for varying action sets by
making certain choices payoff-irrelevant.
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X satisfying |A| ≤ |X| < ∞.8 At time t, the agent can choose any signal about the his-
tory θt with realizations xt in X . In addition, after choosing her action in each period
t, she observes a costless signal yt from a finite set Y distributed according to a given
gt(yt | θt at yt−1) ∈ Δ(Y); we denote by g the complete family of these distributions
across all histories (θt at yt−1). The signal yt incorporates all of the costless informa-
tion the agent receives. For example, yt may correspond to observation of the payoff she
receives in period t, or observation of the realized state (either perfectly or with noise
in each case). One important special case—which has been the focus of the previous dy-
namic RI literature—is when there is no costless information, corresponding to |Y | = 1.
Let zt = (xt yt) and Z =X ×Y . We refer to zt−1 as the decision node at t.
We assume that, for each at , yt is independent of xt conditional on θt and yt−1; while
the agent’s choice of actions may affect the distribution of yt , her choice of information
does not.
A strategy s = (fσ) is a pair composed of
1. an information strategy f consisting of a system of signal distributions ft(xt | θt zt−1),
one for each θt and zt−1, with the signal xt conditionally independent of future states θt′
for all t ′ > t, and
2. an action strategy σ consisting of a system of mappings σt : Zt−1 ×X −→ A, where
σt(z
t−1xt) indicates the choice of action at time t for each history zt−1 and current costly
signal xt .9
Given an action strategy σ , we denote by σt(zt−1xt) the history of actions up to time t
given the realized signals.
The agent receives flow utilities ut(at θt) that depend on the entire history of actions
and states, and that are uniformly bounded across all t. We refer to ut as gross utilities to
indicate that they do not include information costs. The agent discounts payoffs received
at time t by a factor δ(t) :=∏tt′=1 δt′ , where δt′ ∈ [01] and lim supt δt < 1. This form of
discounting accommodates both finite and infinite time horizons.
As is standard in the RI literature, we focus throughout this paper on entropy-based
information costs. Consider a random variable W with finite support S distributed ac-
cording to p ∈ Δ(S). Recall that the entropy
H(W )= −
∑
w∈S
p(w) logp(w)
of W is a measure of uncertainty about W (with the convention that 0 log 0 = 0). At any
signal history zt−1, we assume that the cost of signal xt is proportional to the conditional
mutual information
I
(
θt;xt | zt−1
)=H(θt | zt−1)−Ext [H(θt | zt−1xt) | zt−1] (1)
between xt and the history of states θt . The conditional mutual information captures the
difference in the agent’s uncertainty about θt before and after she receives the signal xt .
Before, her uncertainty can be measured by H(θt | zt−1). After, her level of uncertainty
8The restriction to finite action, signal, and state spaces is technically convenient in that it allows us to work
with discrete distributions, avoiding issues of measurability, and the need to condition on zero probability
histories along the realized action path. We conjecture that Lemma 1, Theorem 1, and Proposition 3 would
extend to standard continuous models.
9This formulation implicitly assumes that the agent perfectly recalls all past information. In contrast,
Woodford (2009) analyzed a model in which all information is costly, even observation of the current time.
526 J. STEINER, C. STEWART, AND F. MATEˇJKA
becomes H(θt | zt−1xt). The mutual information is the expected reduction in uncertainty
averaged across all realizations of xt .10
The agent solves the following problem.
DEFINITION 1: The dynamic rational inattention problem (henceforth dynamic RI prob-
lem) is
max
fσ
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
δ(t)
(
ut
(
σt
(
zt−1xt
)
 θt
)− λI(θt;xt | zt−1))
]
 (2)
where λ > 0 is an information cost parameter, and the expectation is taken with respect to
the distribution over sequences (θt zt)t induced by the prior π together with the strategy
(fσ) and the distributions g of costless signals.
To simplify notation, we normalize λ to 1. Although we assume the information cost
parameter is fixed over time, one could allow for varying cost by adjusting the discount
factors and correspondingly rescaling the flow utilities (as long as doing so does not violate
the restrictions on δ(t) or the uniform boundedness of the utilities).
Note that the sum in (2) converges because the gross flow payoffs are bounded, and the
mutual information is bounded (since the signal space is finite).
One implicit assumption of our model is that the agent’s actions do not affect the dis-
tribution of future states. However, since flow payoffs depend on the entire histories of
actions and states, any problem having this feature is equivalent to one with larger state
spaces that fits within our framework. The idea is to make each state θ˜t in the equivalent
problem correspond to a vector of states in the original problem, one for each history
at−1 of actions. Payoffs in state θ˜t are equal to those in the original problem for the com-
ponent of θ˜t associated with at−1. Similarly, the distribution of θ˜t conditional on θ˜t−1 is
constructed so as to ensure that, for each at−1, the marginal distribution of the compo-
nent associated with at−1 matches the distribution of states in the original problem.
To make this precise, suppose for simplicity that Θt = Θ for all t, and let πt(θ |
θt−1 at−1) ∈ Δ(Θ) denote the probability of state θ in period t following the history
(θt−1 at−1). Let Θ˜t = ΘAt−1 , with typical element θ˜t : At−1 −→ Θ, where A0 := {∅}. An
equivalent problem with state spaces Θ˜t and distributions that are independent of actions
may be obtained by taking gross utilities to be
u˜t
(
at θ˜t
)≡ ut(at (θ˜1(∅)     θ˜t(at−1)))
and the distribution of states in each period t to be
π˜t
(
θ˜t | θ˜t−1
)≡ ∏
at−1∈At−1
πt
(
θ˜t
(
at−1
) | (θ˜1(∅)     θ˜t−1(at−2)) at−1)
Thus, following each history (θ˜t−1 at−1), for θt−1 = (θ˜1(∅)     θ˜t−1(at−2)), there is proba-
bility equal to πt(θt | θt−1) of reaching a state θ˜t in period t satisfying θ˜t(at−1)= θt , ensur-
ing that gross payoffs from each action correspond to ut(at θt).
10Note that I(θt;xt | zt−1) depends on the realization of zt−1. Other authors sometimes use this notation to
refer to the expectation of this quantity across zt−1.
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2.1. Preliminaries
Our main goal is to characterize the agent’s action choices. Let ωt = (θt at−1 yt−1).
A (stochastic) choice rule p is a system of distributions pt(at | ωt) over A, one for each
ωt , interpreted as the probability of choosing at at the history ωt . We say that a strategy
s = (fσ) generates the choice rule p if
pt
(
at |ωt
)≡ Pr(σt(zt−1xt)= at | θtσt−1(zt−2xt−1)= at−1 yt−1)
for all at and ωt = (θt at−1 yt−1), where the probability is evaluated with respect to the
joint distribution of sequences of states and signals generated according to f , σ , and g.
Conversely, a choice rule p can be associated (non-uniquely) with a strategy (fσ).
Roughly speaking, one can choose a particular signal realization in X for each action,
and then match the probability of each of those signal realizations with the probability
the choice rule assigns to its associated action.11 If s is a strategy obtained in this way from
a choice rule p, we say that p induces s.
The following lemma simplifies the analysis considerably by allowing us to focus on a
special class of information strategies in which signals correspond directly to actions. See
also Ravid (2014), who independently proved the corresponding result in a related model
with a continuum of states, and without costless signals.
LEMMA 1: Any strategy s solving the dynamic RI problem generates a choice rule p solving
max
p
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
δ(t)
(
ut
(
at θt
)− I(θt;at | at−1 yt−1))
]
 (3)
where the expectation is with respect to the distribution over sequences (θt at yt)t induced by
p, the prior π, and the distributions g. Conversely, any choice rule p solving (3) induces a
strategy solving the dynamic RI problem.
Accordingly, we henceforth dispense with the signals xt , replacing them with actions
at , so that zt = (at yt), and we abuse terminology slightly by calling (3) the dynamic RI
problem, and any rule p solving (3) a solution to the dynamic RI problem. Proofs are in
the Appendices.
In static models, the conclusion of Lemma 1 holds as long as the cost of signals is
nondecreasing in Blackwell informativeness and all signal structures are feasible. To see
why, consider a strategy in which two distinct signal realizations (each occurring with
positive probability) lead to the same action. Combining these into a single realization
has no effect on the distribution of actions and (weakly) reduces the information cost.
In dynamic problems, more structure is needed because information that is acquired
but not used in a given period may be used later on. For the lemma to hold, it must be
that delaying the acquisition of information until the time when it is used never increases
the information cost relative to acquiring it earlier. For example, if the cost were a nonlin-
ear function of the mutual information, then the agent could have an incentive to acquire
more information than what is necessary for her choice in a given period if she plans to
use that information in a later period where, given the other information she acquires,
11Formally, fix any injection φ : A −→ X and, for any t, let φt denote the mapping from At to Xt ob-
tained by applying φ coordinate-by-coordinate. Given any choice rule p, let s = (fσ) be such that ft(φ(at) |
θtφt−1(at−1) yt−1)≡ pt(at | θt at−1 yt−1) and σ((φt−1(at−1) yt−1)φ(at))≡ at .
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the marginal cost of acquiring it would be higher. When the cost is linear in mutual in-
formation and the agent (weakly) discounts the future, the additive property of entropy
ensures that delaying information acquisition never increases the cost, regardless of other
information acquired by the agent.
Lemma 1 also relies on several other assumptions of our model. The result would not
necessarily hold if |X| < |A|, or if there were restrictions on what information strategies
are feasible. For example, it fails if past states are payoff-relevant but the agent can only
learn about the current state. This lemma also relies on the conditional independence of
xt and yt , for otherwise the choice of costly signal could affect the value of the free infor-
mation conveyed by yt directly (as opposed to indirectly through the choice of action).
PROPOSITION 1: There exists a solution to the dynamic RI problem.
Proposition 1 makes use of the finiteness of A, Y , and each Θt to ensure that the
strategy space is compact, and the boundedness of payoffs together with discounting to
ensure that the agent’s objective function is continuous in her strategy.
3. SOLUTION
This section presents two characterizations of the solution to the dynamic RI problem—
the first in relation to dynamic logit behavior, and the second in relation to static RI
problems. Both characterizations rely on a reformulation of the problem as a control
problem with observable states described in Section 3.3.
3.1. Dynamic Logit
Our main result states that the solution of the dynamic RI problem is a dynamic logit
rule with a bias. We begin by recalling the definition of dynamic logit for general payoffs
with states (θt yt−1) in period t. We denote the payoff function in period t by vt to distin-
guish it from the payoff function ut in the rational inattention problem (which does not
depend on yt−1). Recall that ωt = (θt at−1 yt−1).
DEFINITION 2—Rust (1987): A choice rule r is a dynamic logit rule under payoffs
(vt(atω
t))t if
rt
(
at |ωt
)= exp
(
vˆt
(
atω
t
))
∑
a′t
exp
(
vˆt
(
a′t ω
t
)) 
where
vˆt
(
atω
t
)= vt(atωt)+ δt+1E[Vt+1(ωt+1) | atωt]
and the continuation values Vt satisfy
Vt
(
ωt
)= log(∑
at
exp
(
vˆt
(
atω
t
)))
 (4)
The solution to the dynamic RI problem is a dynamic logit rule under payoffs that
are modified by an endogenous state-independent term. A default rule q is a system of
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conditional action distributions qt(at | zt−1), one for each decision node zt−1 = (at−1 yt−1).
The difference between a default rule and a choice rule is that the latter conditions on θt
while the former does not.
Given any default rule q, write u+ logq to represent the system of payoff functions
vt
(
at θ
t at−1 yt−1
)= ut(at θt)+ logqt(at | at−1 yt−1)
for all t. Let V(v) = Eθ1[V1(θ1∅∅)] denote the first-period expected value from (4) un-
der the system of payoff functions v = (vt)t . For any choice rule p, let pt(at | zt−1) denote
the probability of choosing action at conditional on reaching decision node zt−1, that is,
pt
(
at | zt−1
)=Eθt [pt(at | θt zt−1) | zt−1]
We adopt the convention that log 0 = −∞ and exp(−∞)= 0.
THEOREM 1: Let q be a default rule that solves
max
q˜
V(u+ log q˜)
Then the dynamic logit rule p under payoffs u+ logq solves the dynamic RI problem. More-
over,
qt
(
at | zt−1
)= pt(at | zt−1) (5)
for every decision node zt−1 that is reached with positive probability according to p and g.
A converse to Theorem 1 also holds, with a minor caveat: for any solution p to the
dynamic RI problem, and for q satisfying (5), p coincides with the dynamic logit rule
under payoffs u+ logq at every ωt that is reached with positive probability.
Given a default rule q, we refer to qt(at | zt−1) as the predisposition toward action at at
the decision node zt−1. According to the theorem, the optimal predispositions are identi-
cal to the average behavior at each decision node.
The logq term in the payoffs has a natural interpretation. To keep the discussion simple,
consider the case in which there is no costless signal yt . The agent behaves as if she incurs
a cost
ct
(
at−1 at
)≡ − logqt(at | at−1) (6)
whenever she chooses at after the action history at−1. This endogenous virtual cost is high
when the action at is rarely chosen at at−1. The cost captures the cost of information that
leads to the choice of action at ; actions that are unappealing ex ante can only become
appealing through costly updating of beliefs.
Theorem 1 may be relevant for identification of preferences in dynamic logit models.
Suppose that, as in Rust (1987), an econometrician observes the states θt together with
the choices at , and estimates the agent’s utilities using the dynamic logit rule from Defi-
nition 2. If our model correctly describes the agent’s behavior, then instead of estimating
the utility ut , the econometrician will in fact be estimating ut(at θt) − ct(at−1 at)—the
utility less the virtual cost.
For a fixed decision problem, separately identifying ut and ct is not necessary to describe
behavior: choice probabilities depend only on the difference ut − ct . Put differently, the
two models provide an equally good fit for the data. However, the distinction is impor-
tant when extrapolating to other decision problems (as in counterfactual experiments).
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For example, Rust (1987) considered a bus company’s demand for replacement engines.
He estimated the replacement cost by fitting a dynamic logit model in which the agent
trades off the replacement cost against the expected loss from engine failure. He then
obtained the expected demand by extrapolating to different engine prices, keeping other
components of the replacement cost fixed.
Our model suggests that, if costly information acquisition plays an important role,
Rust’s approach underestimates demand elasticity. Consider an increase in the engine
price. Ceteris paribus, replacement becomes less common, leading to a decrease in the
predisposition toward replacement (by (5)). This corresponds to an increase in the vir-
tual cost ct associated with replacement (by (6)), and hence to an additional decrease in
demand relative to the model in which ct is fixed. Intuitively, the price increase not only
discourages the purchase of a new engine, it also discourages the agent from checking
whether a new engine is needed.12
Kennan and Walker (2011) estimated a dynamic model of migration decisions. Each
agent chooses a location to maximize her expected income less the cost of moving. Esti-
mated moving costs are surprisingly large. If, as in our model, agents can acquire costly
information about wages at other locations, estimates of the moving costs would decrease:
since moves are relatively rare, the log-predisposition term in our model creates a virtual
cost of moving, which the cost identified by Kennan and Walker (2011) combines with
the true moving cost. In addition, Kennan and Walker (2011) considered a counterfactual
policy experiment involving a subsidy for moving. In our model, the effect of the subsidy
would be larger than their estimates. Not only does the subsidy have a direct effect on pay-
offs, it also increases the predisposition toward moving, thereby lowering the associated
virtual cost; the information acquisition induced by the subsidy reinforces the increase in
migration.
Distinguishing the actual utility ut from the virtual cost ct is feasible using data on
choices and states. As described above, one can estimate ut −ct by fitting the dynamic logit
rule from Definition 2. The virtual cost ct(at−1 at) = − logpt(at | at−1) can be identified
directly based on the frequency with which each action is chosen.
3.2. Reduction to Static Problems
The dynamic logit characterization of Theorem 1 is related to a reduction of the dy-
namic RI problem to a collection of static RI problems. This reduction allows us to draw
on well-developed solution methods from the static RI literature. In particular, we obtain
a system of equations describing necessary and sufficient conditions for the solution of
the dynamic RI problem.
As noted in the Introduction, the characterization in terms of static RI problems does
not follow from the Bellman equation alone. Gross expected utilities in static RI prob-
lems are linear in beliefs, but the continuation value function is not. For the resulting
problems to fit the static RI framework, we show that one can ignore the dependence of
continuation values on beliefs and treat them simply as functions of histories. Doing so
restores the linearity of the expected gross payoffs and ensures that the static problem has
the usual RI structure. We explain this step in detail in Section 3.3.
We begin with a brief description of existing results for the static case. Consider a fixed,
finite action set A, a finite state space Θ, a prior π ∈ Δ(Θ), and a payoff function u(aθ).
12Similar comments apply to other work estimating demands using dynamic logit models. For example,
Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012) studied demand for durable goods, while Schiraldi (2011) focused on au-
tomobiles.
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A static choice rule p is a collection of action distributions p(a | θ), one for each θ ∈
Θ. We write πp(θ | a) for the posterior belief after choosing action a given the choice
rule p.13
DEFINITION 3: The static rational inattention problem for a triple (Θπu) is
max
p
E
[
u(aθ)− I(θ;a)]
PROPOSITION 2—Mateˇjka and McKay (2015), Caplin and Dean (2013): The static RI
problem with parameters (Θπu) is solved by the choice rule
p(a | θ)= q(a)exp
(
u(aθ)
)
∑
a′
q
(
a′
)
exp
(
u
(
a′ θ
))  (7)
where the default rule q ∈ Δ(A) maximizes
Eπ
[
log
(∑
a
q(a)exp
(
u(aθ)
))]
 (8)
If action a is chosen with positive probability under the rule p, then the posterior belief after
choosing a satisfies
πp(θ | a)= π(θ)exp
(
u(aθ)
)
∑
a′
q
(
a′
)
exp
(
u
(
a′ θ
))  (9)
We show that the dynamic RI problem can be reduced to a collection of static RI prob-
lems, one for each decision node zt−1. These static problems are interconnected in that
the payoffs and prior in one generally depend on the solutions to the others. At each zt−1,
the gross payoff consists of the flow payoff plus a continuation value, and the prior belief
is obtained by Bayesian updating given zt−1.
We write πp(θt | zt−1) for the agent’s prior over θt at the decision node zt−1 given a
choice rule p, and πp(θt | zt) for the posterior over θt after zt .
We say that a dynamic choice rule is interior if, at every decision node, it chooses each
action with positive probability. For simplicity, we state here the result only for interior
dynamic choice rules. We extend the result to the general case in Proposition 7 in Ap-
pendix B.
PROPOSITION 3: An interior dynamic choice rule p solves the dynamic RI problem if, at
each decision node zt−1 = (at−1 yt−1), pt(at | θt zt−1) solves the static RI problem with state
space Θt , prior belief
πp
(
θt | zt−1)= πp(θt−1 | zt−1)π(θt | θt−1) (10)
13The literature on static rational inattention is richer than Definition 3 suggests. We restrict to the definition
provided here because it is sufficient for our characterization.
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and payoff function
uˆt
(
at θ
t;zt−1)= ut(at θt)+ δt+1E[Vt+1(θt+1 zt) | at θt zt−1] (11)
where the posterior belief πp(θt | zt) satisfies Bayes’s rule with respect to the prior πp(θt |
zt−1), and the continuation values satisfy
Vt
(
θt zt−1
)= log(∑
at
pt
(
at | zt−1
)
exp
(
uˆt
(
at θ
t;zt−1))) (12)
As for Theorem 1, the converse to this proposition holds at all decision nodes reached
with positive probability.
Perhaps surprisingly, this result indicates that when optimizing behavior at a particular
node, we can treat the continuation value as fixed as a function of the history. To under-
stand the role of the continuation values, we note that the solution can be interpreted
as an equilibrium of a common interest game played by multiple players, one for each
period. The player in each period observes the history (at−1 yt−1) but not the choice rule
used in the past. In equilibrium, each player forms beliefs according to the others’ equi-
librium strategies, corresponding to the updating rule described in the proposition. Since
deviations in the choice rule are unobservable to future players, each treats the strategies
of the others (and hence the continuation values) as fixed. Even though the agent in our
model can recall her own past strategy, the proposition indicates that she can ignore the
effect of deviations on future beliefs.
When combined with a result from Caplin and Dean (2013), Proposition 3 provides
necessary and sufficient conditions for solutions to dynamic RI problems. Theorem 1 in
Caplin and Dean (2013) describes necessary and sufficient first-order conditions char-
acterizing the solutions of static RI problems. Therefore, satisfying Caplin and Dean’s
conditions in each of the static problems in Proposition 3 is necessary and sufficient for a
choice rule to be a solution to the dynamic RI problem.
In finite horizon and in stationary problems, the proposition leads to a finite system
of equations characterizing the solution to the dynamic RI problem. Sections 4.2 and 4.3
illustrate this approach.
A complication arises for the characterization in Proposition 3 when the solution of the
dynamic RI problem is not interior. If the choice rule assigns zero probability to some ac-
tion at a decision node, then it is not immediately clear how to define the posterior belief
following that action. This posterior is needed to pin down the optimal continuation play
and value associated with taking the action, which in turn is needed to determine whether
taking the action with zero probability is indeed optimal. Formula (24) in Appendix B
extends the posteriors defined by (9) to histories reached with zero probability. We show
in Appendix B how the extended definition can be obtained by solving the problem in
which the probability of each action is constrained to be at least some ε > 0, then taking
the limit as ε→ 0.
3.3. The Control Problem
We now describe the key step of the proof that leads to the dynamic logit character-
ization and allows us to reduce the dynamic problem to a collection of static ones. The
main idea is to establish an equivalence between the dynamic RI problem and a control
problem with observable states in which the agent must pay a cost for deviating from a
default choice rule.
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Reformulating the dynamic RI problem as a control problem with observable states
addresses the difficulty described above involving the link between the current action
distribution and the future beliefs. The control problem clarifies why this link can be
disregarded and hence the continuation values associated with each history can be treated
as fixed when optimizing the action distribution at each decision node.
DEFINITION 4: Given any default rule q, the control problem for q is
max
p
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
δ(t)
(
ut
(
at θt
)+ logqt(at | zt−1)− logpt(at |ωt))
]
 (13)
where p is a stochastic choice rule, and the expectation is with respect to the joint distri-
bution generated by π, p, and g.
This definition is a dynamic extension of a static control problem studied by Mattsson
and Weibull (2002). In the control problem, the agent has complete information about
the history ωt (and in particular about θt), but must trade off optimizing her flow utility
ut against a control cost: for each ωt = (θt zt−1), she pays a cost
Ept
[
logpt
(
at |ωt
)− logqt(at | zt−1) |ωt]
for deviating from the default action distribution qt(at | zt−1) to the action distribution
pt(at |ωt).
The next result shows that the dynamic RI problem is equivalent to the control problem
with the optimal default rule. In other words, the dynamic RI problem can be solved by
first solving the control problem to find the optimal choice rule p for each default rule q,
and then optimizing q.
LEMMA 2: A stochastic choice rule solves the dynamic RI problem if and only if it (together
with some default rule) solves
max
qp
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
δ(t)
(
ut
(
at θt
)+ logqt(at | zt−1)− logpt(at |ωt))
]
 (14)
where the expectation is with respect to the joint distribution generated by π, p, and g.
To see how Lemma 2 addresses the difficulty due to the link between the current action
distribution and subsequent beliefs, note that for any fixed default rule q, optimizing the
choice rule p in the control problem does not involve updating of beliefs since the agent
observes θt in period t. Since q cannot depend on the history of states, the optimal q
at each decision node zt−1 does depend on the distribution πp(θt | zt−1); however, for
any fixed p, optimizing q does not require varying these distributions because they are
determined by p, not by q.
The proof of the lemma relies on two well-known properties of entropy:
Symmetry: For any random variables X , Y , and Z, I(X;Y |Z)= I(Y ;X |Z).
Properness: For any random variable X with finite support S and distribution p(x) ∈
Δ(S),
H(X)= − max
q∈Δ(S)
Ep
[
logq(x)
]

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To interpret the latter property, consider an agent who believes that X is distributed
according to p and is asked to report a distribution q ∈ Δ(S) before observing the realiza-
tion of X , with the promise of a reward of logq(x) if the realized value is x. Properness
states that the truthful report q= p maximizes the expected reward.
The use of properness in the proof also relies on the information cost being propor-
tional to the reduction in entropy; the result would not hold for costs that are nonlinear
functions of the mutual information.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: By the symmetry of mutual information, the dynamic RI problem
is equivalent to
max
p
E
[∑
t
δ(t)
(
ut
(
at θt
)− I(at;θt | zt−1))
]
= max
p
E
[∑
t
δ(t)
(
ut
(
at θt
)−H(at | zt−1)+H(at |ωt))
]

(15)
By properness,
E
[
−
∑
t
δ(t)H
(
at | zt−1
)]= max
q
E
[∑
t
δ(t) logqt
(
at | zt−1
)]

Substituting this into (15) and recalling that
E
[
H
(
at |ωt
)]=E[− logpt(at |ωt)]
gives the result. Q.E.D.
The dynamic logit result in Theorem 1 follows from solving problem (14). As the fol-
lowing lemma indicates, dynamic logit choice behavior (with biased payoffs) arises as the
solution to the control problem for any fixed q. This lemma extends a result of Mattsson
and Weibull to the dynamic case: they showed that, in the static version of the control
problem, the optimal action distribution is a logit rule with a bias toward actions that are
relatively likely according to the default rule.
LEMMA 3: Given any default rule q, the dynamic logit rule under payoffs u+ logq solves
problem (13).
4. APPLICATIONS
In this section, we apply our results in three examples. The first illustrates the me-
chanics of the model in a particularly simple setting. The second shows how allowing for
unrestricted information choice can generate a simpler solution than one would obtain
with exogenous information or standard restricted classes of signals. The last example
demonstrates that Proposition 3 can be useful in problems with a constraint on informa-
tion acquisition in each period instead of a cost.
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4.1. Status quo Bias
Our first application uses a particularly simple instance of our model to illustrate in-
tertemporal incentives to acquire information. In doing so, we show that the dynamics of
choice by a rationally inattentive agent may resemble status quo bias behavior (see, e.g.,
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988)). The agent chooses an action at ∈ {01} at t = 12.
The gross flow payoff ut is 1 if at = θt , and is 0 otherwise. There is no discounting. The
states are symmetrically distributed and positively correlated across time in the following
way: θ1 is equally likely to be 0 or 1, and, whatever the realized value of θ1, the probability
that θ2 	= θ1 is γ < 1/2. The agent receives no costless signal.
This example can be interpreted as a stylized model of investment in a risky asset. The
agent prefers to invest (corresponding to at = 1) if and only if the return from the asset
exceeds the risk-free rate (corresponding to θt = 1). Learning about the quality of the
asset is costly, as is monitoring its performance.
We analyze the correlation between actions across the two periods. If the agent chooses
not to acquire any information in the second period, then her behavior exhibits an appar-
ent status quo bias insofar as she never reverses her decision, even if the state changes; an
outside observer who sees the realized states and the agent’s actions might conclude that
she has a preference for maintaining the same choice. The following proposition shows
that the optimal strategy has this feature whenever the serial correlation in the state is
sufficiently high.
PROPOSITION 4: There exists γ∗ ∈ (01/2) such that, under the optimal choice rule,
Pr(a2 = a1)= 1 whenever γ < γ∗.
The proposition holds for γ∗ ≈ 016; thus, if the probability that the state changes is less
than 0.16, then the agent acquires information only in the first period, and relies on that
information in both periods. Since the state may change in between the periods, the agent
performs better in the first period than in the second (in the sense that her action is more
likely to match the state).
The superior performance in the first period illustrates the importance of the endoge-
nous timing of information acquisition in our model. In a variant of the model with exoge-
nous conditionally i.i.d. signals, the agent would perform better in the second period than
in the first since she obtains more precise information about θ2 than about θ1. When in-
formation is endogenous, the correlation between the two periods creates an incentive to
acquire more information in the first period because that information can be used twice.
However, correlation does not generate the status quo bias on its own—the temporal
structure also plays an important role in the sense that the effect would not arise if the
agent could acquire information about both states in the first period. To see this, consider
a static variant in which the agent simultaneously chooses a pair of actions (a1 a2) to
maximize
E
[
u1(a1 θ1)+ u2(a2 θ2)− I
(
(θ1 θ2); (a1 a2)
)]

In this case, as in the original example, the optimal strategy involves a single binary signal
and identical actions in the two periods if γ is sufficiently small. In the static variant,
however, the expected performance is constant across the two periods. The asymmetric
performance in the original example arises because it is impossible for the agent to learn
directly about the second period in the first, when information is most valuable.
Finally, to illustrate the role of correlation in the state across periods, consider a bench-
mark in which θ1 and θ2 are independent and uniform on {01}. In that case, any informa-
tion obtained in the first period is useless in the second. The problem therefore reduces
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to a pair of unconnected static RI problems (one for each period). The solution involves
switching actions with probability 1/2 and constant performance across the two periods.
Although the solution when the states are correlated may appear as if the agent has
a preference against switching her action, the independent case highlights the difference
between such a preference and the effect of information acquisition; if the “status quo
bias” behavior were driven by preferences, it would not depend on correlation between
the states.
4.2. Inertia
Our second application consists of a stationary infinite-horizon environment in which
the state follows a Markov chain and the agent chooses an action in each period with the
goal of matching the state. This example can be viewed as a stylized model of a wide range
of economic phenomena. The action could represent a consumer’s choice of what product
to purchase, an investor’s choice of whether to hold a particular asset, or a worker’s choice
of whether to participate in the labor market. We start by analyzing a model in which all
information acquired by the agent is costly. For example, in product choice, one can think
of the state as capturing which product offers a larger surplus, which is costly to monitor.
Comparative statics of adjustment patterns with respect to the stochastic properties of
the agent’s environment are a central question in the RI literature. Existing studies, such
as Sims (2003), Moscarini (2004), Luo (2008), and Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt (2009),
provide results for quadratic payoffs and normally distributed shocks. Our framework
provides an alternative approach suitable for general payoffs and distributions in discrete
environments.
The agent chooses an action at ∈ {01} in each period t ∈ N. The state θt follows a
Markov chain on {01} with time-homogeneous transition probabilities γ(θθ′) from θ to
θ′. In each period t, the gross flow payoff u(at θt) is ua > 0 if at = θt = a, and 0 if at 	= θt .
Payoffs are discounted exponentially with discount factor δ ∈ (01). The agent receives
no costless signal.
In contrast to the analogous model with exogenous information, behavior in this frame-
work is Markovian: the choice rule, continuation values, and predispositions in any period
t depend on the last action at−1 and the current state θt , but not on any earlier actions or
states. Moreover, after a finite number of periods, the choice rule is stationary. This im-
plies that the long-run behavior is characterized by a finite set of equations, making it
amenable to numerical computation. This Markov property of the solution holds for arbi-
trary finite sets of actions and states, general time-homogeneous Markov processes, and
general utilities as long as all actions are chosen with positive probability at all decision
nodes.14 This feature highlights the relative simplicity of the rationally inattentive solution
compared to that of similar decision problems with exogenous conditionally i.i.d. signals.
In the exogenous case, the optimal strategy is not Markov: actions depend on the entire
history of signals, the probabilities of which in turn depend on the entire history of states.
Characterizing the distribution of actions is therefore complicated even in the simplest
cases.
The Markov property of the solution follows from Proposition 3 together with a result
of Caplin and Dean (2013). They showed that in static RI problems, the set of posterior
14The structure of our solution resembles that of the bounded memory model of Wilson (2014). Each action
in our model can be viewed as a “memory state,” with the agent’s strategy describing stochastic transitions
among them. As in Wilson’s model, beliefs in each memory state depend on the agent’s entire strategy.
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beliefs that arises from the optimal choice of signal is constant across priors lying within its
convex hull. By Proposition 3, the same result holds in dynamic problems. In the present
setting, it follows that the agent’s posterior after choosing at is independent of her prior
at the beginning of period t whenever she acquires a nontrivial signal. In particular, this
posterior is independent of at−1.
Given an optimal choice rule p, we denote by pˆ(at | θt at−1) the long-run stationary
choice rule; thus, pˆ(at | θt at−1)≡ pt(at | θt at−1) for sufficiently large t.
We say that a solution is eventually interior if there exists t ′ such that, for every t > t ′,
each action is chosen with positive probability at each at−1. Lemma 6 in Appendix C
translates Proposition 3 to characterize the long-run solution in the present setting in
terms of a system of equations, provided that it is eventually interior. One can check
whether this is the case by solving the system of equations in the lemma. If all of the
resulting predispositions lie in (01), then there is indeed an eventually interior solution.
The next result shows that the model generates intuitive comparative statics.15 We say
that the states θt have positive persistence if γ(00) + γ(11) > 1; similarly, actions at
eventually have positive persistence if Pr(at = 0 | at−1 = 0)+ Pr(at = 1 | at−1 = 1) > 1 for
all t sufficiently large. Positive persistence captures inertia in the process: it says that the
state one period earlier is more likely to be the same as the current state than different.
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose states have positive persistence and the solution is eventually
interior. Then
1. actions eventually have positive persistence, and moreover, the choice rule satisfies pˆ(at |
θt at−1) > pˆ(at | θt a′t−1) whenever at = at−1 	= a′t−1; and
2. the posterior probability πp(θt = a | at = a′) is nonincreasing in the payoff ua for all
aa′ ∈ {01} and all t.
The first part of the proposition says that inertia in the state will be reflected by inertia
in behavior. The second part says that if ua increases, the agent adjusts her information
in such a way that her degree of certainty when choosing a falls, while her degree of
certainty when choosing the other action rises. Both results follow from analyzing the
system of equations described in Lemma 6.
We now extend the model to allow for the agent to receive costless signals—in the form
of observation of flow payoffs—at the end of each period. How does the provision of free
information affect choice behavior? We show that costless signals crowd out informa-
tion acquisition. In some cases, the crowding-out effect is so strong that the agent is less
likely to choose the optimal action with costless signals than without them. This result im-
plies that providing free information can lower the agent’s gross payoffs. Her net payoffs,
however, cannot decrease: whatever loss she incurs from choosing suboptimal actions is
compensated by a lower cost of information acquisition.
As a benchmark, consider a static RI problem (Θπu) with solution p. Suppose the
agent, before acquiring information, receives a costless signal, y . We focus on the case in
which y is less informative than the signal the agent acquires in the original problem; that
is, we suppose that for each realization of y , the belief π(θ | y) lies in the convex hull of
the posteriors arising from p.16 Upon observing y , the agent solves the static RI problem
(Θπ(· | y)u). We denote the optimal choice after observing y by p˜(a | θ y). We are
15Additional comparative statics results may be found in an earlier version of this paper (Steiner, Stewart,
and Mateˇjka (2015)).
16Whenever π(θ | y) lies outside this convex hull, the agent acquires no additional information.
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interested in the distribution of the agent’s actions in each state; accordingly, define the
average choice rule p˜(a | θ) :=∑y π(y | θ)p˜(a | θ y).
In this case, the average choice rule p˜(a | θ) is identical to p(a | θ); whether or not the
agent receives free information has no effect on her behavior in each state. This obser-
vation follows from the result in Caplin and Dean (2013) that the optimal posteriors in
static RI problems are the same across all priors within their convex hull: since the prior
belief and the sets of posteriors are the same in the two problems, so is the distribution of
actions in each state.
In dynamic decision problems, provision of free information has an additional effect.
In choosing what information to acquire, the agent must consider its value not only in the
current period but also in the future. If the agent did not expect to receive costless signals
in future periods, the effect of a (not-too-strong) costless signal before the current period
would be to exactly crowd out information acquisition, as in the static case. However,
receiving additional signals in the future tends to lower the value of acquiring information
today, leading to a reduction in the overall precision of information in each period.
To illustrate, suppose the realized payoff given at and θt is stochastic. More specifically,
if at = θt , the agent receives—and freely observes—a flow payoff of 12λ−1 with probability λ
and of 0 with probability 1−λ, where λ ∈ (1/21]. If at 	= θt , the agent receives a flow pay-
off of 12λ−1 with probability 1−λ and of 0 with probability λ. Flow payoffs are independent
across periods conditional on the history of states. Let u(at θt) denote the expected flow
payoff given (at θt), and note that, for every λ, the payoff difference u(θθ)−u(1−θθ)
is 1 for each θ.
Higher values of λ correspond to more precise costless signals. When λ = 1, the flow
payoff perfectly reveals the state θt at the end of each period. In this case, continuation
values are independent of the current action. The agent therefore acquires the same signal
as if the choice for the current period were a static problem. At the other extreme, for λ
close to 1/2, this model approximates the one with no costless signal.
Suppose γ(01) = γ(10). Symmetry implies that the solution is characterized by a
precision π(λ) ∈ (1/21) such that, in every period t for which the agent’s prior belief that
θt = 0 lies in [1 −π(λ)π(λ)], her posterior after observing xt is either π(λ) or 1 −π(λ).
From the characterization in Proposition 3, it follows that the optimal precision is the
value of π that maximizes
π +H(π)− δEy
[
H
(
πp(πy)
)]
 (16)
where πp(πy) denotes the prior belief assigned to a given state in period t + 1 if π is the
belief in period t at the time the action is chosen, and the agent receives flow payoff y in
period t. The first term in (16) captures the impact of π on the expected gross payoff in
period t. The second term captures the impact on the information cost in period t. The
third term captures the impact of the belief in period t on the information cost in period
t + 1 through its effect on the prior belief in the latter period.
Figure 1 depicts the optimal precision, obtained by maximizing (16) numerically. Pre-
cision decreases in the informativeness of the flow payoffs. Since the precision is equal to
the probability that the agent’s action matches the state in each period, the agent’s gross
payoff also decreases with λ.
4.3. Response Times
A large body of research in psychology—and more recently in economics—has ex-
amined response times in decision-making (e.g., see Rubinstein (2007)). An important
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FIGURE 1.—Precision, π(λ), as a function of the informativeness of flow payoffs for discount factor δ= 09
and transition probabilities γ(01)= γ(10)= 09.
methodological question in this area is whether choice procedures should be modeled ex-
plicitly or in reduced form. Sims (2003) argued that the RI framework is a promising tool
for incorporating response times into traditional economic models that treat decision-
making as a black box. Our model, with its focus on sequential choice, is a step in this
direction. Woodford (2014) studied delayed decisions in an RI model that focuses on
neurological decision procedures.17
We focus on the following simple model. The state θ ∈ {01} is uniformly distributed
and fixed over time. In each period t = 1    T , the agent chooses a terminal action 0 or
1, or waiting (denoted by w). She receives a benefit of 1 if her terminal action matches
the state, and 0 otherwise. In addition, she incurs a cost c ∈ (01) for each period that she
waits. Letting wt = (w    w) (t times), the agent’s total gross payoff is the undiscounted
sum of the flow payoffs
ut
(
at θ
)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if at = (wt−1 θ)
0 if at = (wt−11 − θ)
−c if at =wt
0 otherwise
This formulation is similar to the model of Arrow, Blackwell, and Girshick (1949) except
that information is endogenous; see also Fudenberg, Strack, and Strzalecki (2015).
With the information cost function as in our general model, the solution to this problem
is trivial: since delay is costly, any strategy that involves delayed decisions is dominated
by a strategy that generates the same distribution of terminal actions in the first period.
However, some delay is optimal in a closely related variation of the model in which—
as in much of the RI literature—there is an upper bound on how much information the
17See Spiliopoulos and Ortmann (2014) for a review of psychological and economic research on decision
times, and of the methodological differences between the two fields.
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agent can process in a given amount of time; thus, delaying allows her to process more
information. We view this formulation as natural for capturing perceptual experiments
that take place over a short time. Accordingly, the agent solves
max
fσ
E
[
T∑
t=1
ut
(
σt
(
xt
)
 θ
)]

s.t. I
(
θ;xt | xt−1
)≤ κ for all xt−1 and t = 1     T
(17)
where κ > 0 is the capacity constraint on the information acquired per period, f = (f (xt |
xt−1))t is the information strategy, and σ = (σt(xt))t is the action strategy. We assume that
there are at least four signal realizations (i.e., |X| ≥ 4), and that κT < log 2, which means
that the capacity is not large enough for the agent to learn the state perfectly within the
T periods.
Given a strategy for the agent, let rt = Pr(at 	= w | at−1 = wt−1) and gt = Pr(at = θ |
at−1 = wt−1 and at 	= w). We refer to rt as the (hazard) rate and gt as the accuracy of
terminal actions at time t.
PROPOSITION 6: For each κ, there exist c and c with c > c > 0 such that if c ∈ (c c), then
(17) has a solution in which the rate rt is positive and constant across t < T , rT = 1, and
gt = exp(κ/c)1+exp(κ/c) for every t.
This result indicates that the solution involves constant accuracy across periods, and a
constant rate until the final period (at which point taking a terminal action is always opti-
mal). This solution reflects two tradeoffs. First, for given rates rt , the agent can trade off
accuracy across periods: decreasing accuracy in one period frees up capacity that can be
used to acquire information that improves the accuracy of future decisions. The marginal
value of capacity must be equalized across periods, which occurs when accuracy is con-
stant. The second tradeoff is between speed and accuracy. Increasing the rate of terminal
actions lowers the expected waiting cost but requires a corresponding decrease in accu-
racy so as not to violate the capacity constraint. The optimal accuracy therefore depends
on both the capacity, κ, and the waiting cost, c.
Although problem (17) does not fit directly into our general model, we show in the
proof of Proposition 6 that it can be solved by transforming it into a problem that does.
We first consider a relaxed problem in which capacity is storable; the agent therefore
faces a cumulative capacity constraint at each decision node. Because of the additivity of
mutual information, the behavior in any solution to this relaxed problem can be replicated
in the original problem (although the timing of information acquisition may differ). The
Lagrangian for this relaxed problem is a special case of the objective function in our
general model; accordingly, we find the solution using Proposition 3.
Unlike our general model, problem (17) cannot be solved by a strategy in which sig-
nal realizations map one-to-one to actions (as in Lemma 1): with constant accuracy and
binding constraints, the only way to achieve a higher rate in the final period is to acquire
information even when choosing to wait. With four possible signal realizations, an opti-
mal strategy has two realizations leading to posteriors gt and 1 − gt , at which the agent
chooses a terminal action, and two realizations leading to posteriors closer to 1/2, at
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which the agent waits. Lemma 1 does hold in the relaxed problem with storable capacity;
in that problem, any information obtained while waiting can be delayed until it is used for
a terminal decision.
How do response times vary with the capacity κ? Higher values of κ can be interpreted
as describing an agent with higher ability, or a decision problem that is easier to solve.
Given the solution in Proposition 6 together with the fact that the constraints in (17)
bind, one can compute the rate rt numerically. We find that the rate is not monotone
in the capacity: decisions are fastest when the capacity is high or low, and slowest for
intermediate capacities. If the capacity is low, there is little incentive to delay the deci-
sion since the cost of delay is large relative to the value of the additional information
that can be acquired. If the capacity is high, the agent can acquire precise information
quickly and then has little incentive to delay in order to acquire additional information.
If individual subjects can be treated as having a fixed capacity across problems in an ex-
periment, this suggests that we should expect significant differences in the correlation
between accuracy and decision times depending on whether the data are within or across
subjects.
5. SUMMARY
We solve a general dynamic decision problem in which an agent repeatedly acquires in-
formation, facing entropy-based information costs. The optimal behavior is stochastic—
the action distribution at each decision node complies with a logit choice rule—and
biased—compared to the standard dynamic logit model, the agent behaves as if she in-
curs a cost for choosing actions that are unlikely ex ante. When incentives are serially
correlated, the agent exhibits an endogenous conservative bias that results in stickiness in
her actions. The distinction between real and informational frictions is a central topic of
the RI literature that has been studied in particular settings. This paper formalizes, in a
general setting, an equivalence between the two frictions within any given decision prob-
lem, while showing that they lead to distinct predictions when extrapolating to different
problems.
As a tool for solving the problem, we show that the RI model with incomplete informa-
tion and learning is behaviorally equivalent to a complete information control problem.
The agent behaves as if she faces a cost of deviating from a default choice rule, but also
engages in a second layer of optimization: at the ex ante stage, she optimizes the default
rule, which is independent of the state of the world, and ex post, the agent chooses an
optimal deviation from the default rule given the incentives in the realized state and the
control cost.
APPENDIX A: PROOFS FOR SECTION 2.1
The next two lemmas are used to prove Lemma 1. The first relies on the conditional
independence of xt and yt , the additive property of entropy, and the symmetry of mutual
information.
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LEMMA 4: Let at = σt(zt−1xt). The total discounted information cost associated with
any strategy (fσ) satisfies
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
δ(t)I
(
θt;xt | zt−1
)]
=E
[ ∞∑
t=1
((−δ(t) + δ(t+1))H(θt | xt yt)− δ(t)H(yt | xt yt−1)
+ δ(t)H(yt | θt at yt−1)+ δ(t)H(θt | θt−1))
]

(18)
PROOF: Recall that
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
δ(t)I
(
θt;xt | zt−1
)]=E
[ ∞∑
t=1
δ(t)
(
H
(
θt | xt−1 yt−1)−H(θt | xt yt−1))
]
 (19)
By the symmetry of mutual information, for at = σt(zt−1xt),
E
[
H
(
θt | xt yt−1)−H(θt | xt yt)]=E[I(θt; yt | xt yt−1)]
=E[I(yt;θt | xt yt−1)]
=E[H(yt | xt yt−1)−H(yt | θtxt yt−1)]
=E[H(yt | xt yt−1)−H(yt | θt at yt−1)]
where the last step follows from the independence of xt and yt conditional on (θt yt−1 at).
In addition, by the additive property of entropy and the independence of θt and
(xt−1 yt−1) conditional on θt−1,
E
[
H
(
θt | xt−1 yt−1)]=E[H(θt−1 | xt−1 yt−1)+H(θt | θt−1xt−1 yt−1)]
=E[H(θt−1 | xt−1 yt−1)+H(θt | θt−1)]
Substituting the last two identities into the right-hand side of (19) gives
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
δ(t)
(
H
(
θt−1 | xt−1 yt−1)−H(θt | xt yt)−H(yt | xt yt−1)
+H(yt | θt at yt−1)+H(θt | θt−1))
]

Rearranging terms gives the result. Q.E.D.
LEMMA 5: Let χ, ξ, and ζ be finite random variables such that ζ is measurable with
respect to ξ. Then E[H(χ | ξ)] ≤E[H(χ | ζ)].
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PROOF: Since ζ is measurable with respect to ξ, Pr(χ | ζ) ≡ ∑ξ Pr(χ | ξ)Pr(ξ | ζ).
Thus, Pr(χ | ζ) is a convex combination of the distributions Pr(χ | ξ) (as ξ varies). The
result follows from the concavity of entropy. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: Let s be a strategy and p the choice rule generated by s. By
construction, s and p give the same stream of expected gross payoffs. We claim that the
information cost
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
I
(
θt;at | at−1 yt−1
)]
associated with p is no larger than that associated with s, which, by Lemma 4, is equal
to the right-hand side of (18). The information cost associated with p can be expressed
in exactly the same way except with at in place of each xt . These two expressions can be
compared term-by-term. By Lemma 5, E[H(θt | xt yt)] ≤ E[H(θt | at yt)] and E[H(yt |
xt yt−1)] ≤ E[H(yt | at yt−1)] for every t. Since δ(t+1) ≤ δ(t), this implies that the first two
terms of the sum on the right-hand of (18) are at least as large as the corresponding terms
in the expression associated with p. Since the last two terms of the sum are identical in
the two cases, the claim follows.
We have shown that the discounted expected payoff from any strategy s is no larger
than the value of the objective function in (3) given the choice rule generated by s. Con-
versely, the discounted expected payoff from any strategy induced by a choice rule p is
identical to the value of the objective function in (3) given p. Together, these two rela-
tionships imply the result. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: Consider the space of strategies Π =∏t Δ(A)Θt×At−1×Yt−1 .
By Tychonoff’s theorem, the space Π is compact in the product topology, and because
ut is uniformly bounded, the objective function is continuous. Therefore, an optimum
exists. Q.E.D.
APPENDIX B: PROOFS FOR SECTION 3
PROOF OF LEMMA 3: Given q, let vt(atωt) = ut(at θt) + logqt(at | at−1 yt−1) for all
ωt = (θt at−1 yt−1). For each ωt such that Pr(ωt) > 0 (where the probability is with re-
spect to π, q, and g), let
Vt
(
ωt
)= 1
δ(t)
max
{pτ(·|ωτ)}∞τ=t
E
[ ∞∑
τ=t
δ(τ)
(
vτ
(
aτω
τ
)− logpτ(aτ |ωτ)) ∣∣∣ωt
]
;
thus, Vt(ωt) is the continuation value in the control problem for q. If Pr(ωt)= 0, we define
Vt(ω
t) arbitrarily.
When Pr(ωt) > 0, the value Vt satisfies the recursion
Vt
(
ωt
)= max
pt(·|ωt)
E
[
vt
(
atω
t
)− logpt(at |ωt)+ δt+1Vt+1(ωt+1) |ωt] (20)
(recall that δt+1 = δ(t+1)/δ(t)).
To solve the maximization problem in (20), note first that, since vt(atωt)= ut(at θt)+
logqt(at | zt−1) (for zt−1 = (at−1 yt−1)), if qt(at | zt−1) = 0—and hence logqt(at | zt−1) =
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−∞—for some at , then we must have pt(at | (θt−1 θt) zt−1) = 0 for every θt satisfying
π(θt−1 θt) > 0.18 Accordingly, let A(zt−1) = {at ∈ A : qt(at | zt−1) > 0}, and suppose at ∈
A(zt−1) and π(θt−1 θt) > 0. If A(zt−1) is a singleton, then pt(at | (θt−1 θt) zt−1) = 1.
Otherwise, the first-order condition for the optimization problem in (20) with respect to
pt(at |ωt) is
vt
(
atω
t
)− (logpt(at |ωt)+ 1)+ δt+1E[Vt+1(ωt+1) |ωtat]= μt(ωt) (21)
where μt(ωt) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint
∑
a′t pt(a
′
t |ωt)= 1.
Rearranging the first-order condition gives
pt
(
at |ωt
)= exp(vt(atωt)− 1 + δt+1V t+1(atωt)−μt(ωt))
where V t+1(atωt) := E[Vt+1(ωt+1) | ωtat]. Since ∑a′t∈A(zt−1) pt(a′t | ωt) = 1, it follows
that
pt
(
at |ωt
)= exp
(
vt
(
atω
t
)− 1 + δt+1V t+1(atωt)−μt(ωt))∑
a′t∈A(zt−1)
exp
(
vt
(
a′t ω
t
)− 1 + δt+1V t+1(a′t ωt)−μt(ωt))
= exp
(
vt
(
atω
t
)+ δt+1V t+1(atωt))∑
a′t∈A(zt−1)
exp
(
vt
(
a′t ω
t
)+ δt+1V t+1(a′t ωt)) 
Substituting into (20) gives the recursion
V t
(
at−1ωt−1
)=E[−δt+1V t+1(atωt)
+ log
( ∑
a′t∈A(zt−1)
exp
(
vt
(
a′t ω
t
)+ δt+1V t+1(a′t ωt))
)
+ δt+1V t+1
(
atω
t
) ∣∣∣ωt−1 at−1
]

and therefore,
V t
(
at−1ωt−1
)
=E
[
log
( ∑
a′t∈A(zt−1)
exp
(
vt
(
a′t ω
t
)+ δt+1V t+1(a′t ωt))
) ∣∣∣ωt−1 at−1
]
=E
[
log
(∑
a′t∈A
q
(
a′t | zt−1
)
exp
(
ut
((
at−1 a′t
)
 θt
)+ δt+1V t+1(a′t ωt))
) ∣∣∣ωt−1 at−1
]

as needed. Q.E.D.
18If π(θt−1 θt)= 0, then pt(at | (θt−1 θt) zt−1) has no effect on the value and can be chosen arbitrarily.
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PROOF OF THEOREM 1: The first assertion follows immediately from Lemmas 2 and 3.
For the second assertion, fixing p, if zt−1 is reached with positive probability, properness
implies that qt(at | zt−1)= pt(at | zt−1) maximizes the objective in problem (14). Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: Given zt−1 and continuation values Vt+1(ωt+1), we refer
to the static problem described in the proposition as the static RI problem at zt−1. Each
of these static problems is a special case of our general model; in particular, Lemma 2
implies that pt(at | θt zt−1) solves the static RI problem at zt−1 if and only if it, together
with some qt(· | zt−1), solves the corresponding control problem
max
qt (·|zt−1){pt(·|θt zt−1)}θt
E
[
uˆt
(
at θ
t;zt−1)+ logqt(at | zt−1)− logpt(at | θt zt−1) | zt−1] (22)
where the expectation is with respect to the joint distribution of at , θt , and yt generated
by the prior πp(θt | zt−1) together with {pt(· | θt zt−1)}θt . We call (22) the control problem
at zt−1.
By Lemma 2, it suffices to prove that any solution of the control problem (problem
(14)) coincides at every zt−1 with a solution of the control problem at zt−1. By Lemma 3,
for any given q, the objective function in (14) is maximized by p satisfying
pt
(
at | θt zt−1
)= qt
(
at | zt−1
)
exp
(
uˆ
(
at θ
t;zt−1))∑
a′t
qt
(
a′t | zt−1
)
exp
(
uˆ
(
a′t  θ
t;zt−1))  (23)
Similarly, for each zt−1, given qt(· | zt−1), this pt maximizes the objective function in the
control problem at zt−1.
Let q be a solution to (14) (together with p given by (23)). Since p is interior, it follows
from (23) that pt(at | ωt) > 0 for every ωt . The result now follows from the Principle
of Optimality: the control problem at zt−1 corresponds to the Bellman equation at that
decision node, and hence qt(· | zt−1) and pt(· | θt zt−1) also solve the control problem at
zt−1 (and conversely). Q.E.D.
We now extend Proposition 3 to cases in which the solution to the dynamic RI problem
is not interior. To do this, we must ensure that prior beliefs in the static problems are
defined appropriately to generate the correct continuation values. We define the posterior
belief in a static RI problem after an action a is taken with zero probability to be
πp(θ | a)= 1∑
θ′
π
(
θ′
) expu(aθ′)∑
a′
q
(
a′
)
expu
(
a′ θ′
)
π(θ)expu(aθ)∑
a′
q
(
a′
)
expu
(
a′ θ
)  (24)
This expression coincides with (9) when a is chosen with positive probability. Otherwise,
it differs from (9) only by a renormalization. The main idea of the proof is to add an addi-
tional constraint placing a lower bound on every qt(at | zt−1) in both the original control
problem and the control problem at zt−1, and then examine the limit as this lower bound
vanishes. The same argument as in the proof of Proposition 3 applies to the problems
with the lower bound, and continuity yields the desired result in the limit.
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PROPOSITION 7: There exists a dynamic choice rule p solving the dynamic RI problem
such that, at each decision node zt−1, pt(at | θt zt−1) solves the static RI problem with state
space Θt , prior belief πp(θt | zt−1) satisfying (10), and payoff function uˆt given by (11), where
the posterior belief πp(θt | at zt−1) formed after taking action at at the decision node zt−1
complies with (24), and the continuation values satisfy (12).
PROOF: Consider, for ε ∈ (01/|A|), the ε-control problem, which is identical to the
original control problem (problem (14)) except that for each at and zt−1, there is a con-
straint that qt(at | zt−1) ≥ ε. Define the ε-control problem at zt−1 analogously. The argu-
ment in the proof of Proposition 3 applies here to show that, for each ε, the solutions to
the ε-control problem coincide with those of the full collection of ε-control problems at
decision nodes zt−1. Moreover, essentially the same argument as in the proof of Proposi-
tion 1 establishes that a solution to each ε-control problem exists.
By Lemma 3, the solution to (and value of) the control problem for q is continuous in
q (with respect to the product topology). Therefore, any limit point—as ε vanishes—of
the set of solutions to the ε-control problem is a solution to the original control problem.
An analogous argument applies to the ε-control problem at each zt−1 provided that the
continuation values and priors approach those described in the proposition as ε vanishes.
For each ωt = (θt at−1 yt−1) and ε, let V εt (ωt) denote the continuation value in the
ε-control problem. Consider the ε-control problem at zt−1 = (at−1 yt−1), and write πp for
the prior and uˆεt for the analogue of uˆt with continuation values V
ε
t in place of Vt . We have
V εt
(
ωt
)= log(∑
at
qt
(
at | zt−1
)
exp
(
uˆεt
(
atω
t
)))

which converges to the expression in (12) since pt(at | zt−1)= qt(at | zt−1) at an optimum.
For the priors, note that the first-order condition with respect to qt(at | zt−1) for a solu-
tion of the ε-control problem at zt−1 with qt(at | zt−1) ∈ (ε1) is
∑
θt
πp
(
θt
)
exp uˆε
(
atω
t
)
∑
a′t
qt
(
a′t | zt−1
)
exp uˆε
(
a′t ω
t
) = μ (25)
where μ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint
∑
a′t qt(a
′
t | zt−1) = 1.
Note that there must exist some at for which qt(at | zt−1) ∈ (ε1). For this action at , we
have pt(at | zt−1)= qt(at | zt−1), and hence the left-hand side of (25) is the sum of poste-
rior beliefs, which must be equal to 1.
Now consider at for which the solution is qt(at | zt−1)= ε (if such an at exists). Then we
must have ∑
θt
πp
(
θt
)
exp uˆε
(
atω
t
)
∑
a′t
qt
(
a′t | zt−1
)
exp uˆε
(
a′t ω
t
) ≤ μ= 1
In this case, the posterior beliefs satisfy
πp
(
θt | at zt−1
)
= πp
(
θt
)
pt
(
at | zt−1
)pt(at |ωt)
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= qt
(
at | zt−1
)
pt
(
at | zt−1
) πp
(
θt
)
exp
(
uˆε
(
atω
t
))
∑
a′t
qt
(
a′t | zt−1
)
exp
(
uˆε
(
a′t ω
t
))
= 1∑
θ˜t
πp
(
θ˜t
) exp(uˆε(atωt))∑
a′t
qt
(
a′t | zt−1
)
exp
(
uˆε
(
a′t  ω˜
t
))
πp
(
θt
)
exp
(
uˆε
(
atω
t
))
∑
a′t
qt
(
a′t | zt−1
)
exp
(
uˆε
(
a′t ω
t
)) 
where ω˜t = (θ˜t at−1 yt−1). Therefore, as ε vanishes, the posteriors indeed approach those
given by (24). Q.E.D.
APPENDIX C: PROOFS AND COMPUTATIONS FOR SECTION 4
C.1. Status quo Bias
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: By symmetry, the predispositions in the first period are
given by q1(0) = q1(1) = 1/2, and in the second period, q2(0 | 0) = q2(1 | 1). Denote the
latter by s. Also by symmetry, the continuation value function attains only two values:
V2
(
a1 θ
2
)=
{
Vc if a1 = θ2
Vw if a1 	= θ2
where Vc is the expected payoff in period 2 (including the information cost) when a1 = θ2,
and Vw is the corresponding payoff when a1 	= θ2. By Theorem 1 and (4), the continuation
values satisfy Vw = log(s + (1 − s)e) and Vc = log(se+ (1 − s)).
Applying Theorem 1 and (4) together with symmetry in the first period gives the ex-
pected payoff
log
(
1
2
exp
(
1 + (1 − γ)Vc + γVw
)+ 1
2
exp
(
(1 − γ)Vw + γVc
))

where the predisposition s maximizes this expression (subject to 0 ≤ s ≤ 1). This is equiv-
alent to maximizing
W (s;γ) := exp(1 + (1 − γ)Vc + γVw)+ exp((1 − γ)Vw + γVc)
= e(se+ (1 − s))1−γ(s+ (1 − s)e)γ + (s + (1 − s)e)1−γ(se+ (1 − s))γ
Note that, because γ ∈ (01/2), W (s;γ) ≥ W (1 − s;γ) for s > 1/2, and thus the maxi-
mand is at least 1/2.
It is straightforward to verify that W (s;γ) is concave in s, and its derivative (with respect
to s) at s = 1 is positive when γ = 0. It follows that the optimal value of s is 1 when γ = 0,
and therefore, by continuity, there exists γ∗ ∈ (01/2) such that this is true whenever
γ < γ∗. Q.E.D.
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C.2. Inertia
LEMMA 6: Suppose there is an eventually interior solution. Then there exists t ′ such that
for t > t ′, conditional on at−1 and θt , at is independent of θt−1 and at−2. Moreover, there is an
optimal choice rule for which pt(at | θt at−1)≡ pˆ(at | θt at−1) in each period t > t ′, where
pˆ(at | θt at−1)= qˆ(at | at−1)exp
(
u(at θt)+ δE
[
V (at θt+1) | θt
])
∑
a′t
qˆ
(
a′t | at−1
)
exp
(
u
(
a′t  θt
)+ δE[V (a′t  θt+1) | θt])  (26)
where the continuation payoffs solve
V (at−1 θt)= log
(∑
at
qˆ(at | at−1)exp
(
u(at θt)+ δE
[
V (at θt+1) | θt
]))
 (27)
the predispositions qˆ(at | at−1) solve∑
θt−1
πp(θt−1 | at−1)γ(θt−1 θt)=
∑
at
qˆ(at | at−1)πp(θt | at) (28)
for all θt and at−1, and the posteriors πˆp(θt | at)≡∑θt−1 πp((θt−1 θt) | (at−1 at)) satisfy
πˆp(θt | at)
πˆp
(
θt | a′t
) = exp
(
u(at θt)+ δE
[
V (at θt+1) | θt
])
exp
(
u
(
a′t  θt
)+ δE[V (a′t  θt+1) | θt])  (29)
PROOF: The result follows directly from Proposition 3. It suffices to verify that pˆ(at |
θt at−1) and qˆ(at | at−1) solve the static RI problem at each at−1. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: For each a ∈ {01}, let πa denote the posterior πˆp(θt = 1 |
at = a), and πa the prior πˆp(θt = 1 | at−1 = a) ≡∑θt−1 πp((θt−11) | (at−2 a)) associated
with the stationary solution when t is sufficiently large. Since the expected posterior is
equal to the prior, we have qˆ(a | a)πa + qˆ(1−a | a)π1−a = πa for each a ∈ {01}. Together
with qˆ(a | a)+ qˆ(1 − a | a)= 1, these two equations imply
qˆ(a | a)− qˆ(a | 1 − a)= πa −π1−a
πa −π1−a
for each a. Substituting πa = πaγ(11) + (1 − πa)γ(01) and the analogous expression
for π1−a leads to qˆ(a | a)− qˆ(a | 1 − a)= γ(11)− γ(01)= γ(11)+ γ(00)− 1, which
is positive since states have positive persistence. That pˆ(a | θa) > pˆ(a | θ1−a) for each
a follows from this last result together with (26).
For part 2, suppose without loss of generality that a= 1. Consider a static RI problem
with Θ = A = {01} and payoffs u(aθ) satisfying u(aa) ≡ ua > 0 and u(1 − aa) = 0
for each a ∈ {01}. Suppose, moreover, that the solution is interior. By (9),
π1s
π0s
= expu1 and 1 −π
1
s
1 −π0s
= exp(−u0)
where πas denotes the posterior π
p(θ = 1 | a). It is straightforward to verify that the pos-
teriors π1s and π
0
s solving these two equations decrease in u1 and increase in u0.
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Now consider the dynamic problem. By Proposition 3 and Lemma 6, the solution is
the same as in a static RI problem with payoffs uˆ(at θt)= uat1at=θt + δE[V (at θt+1;u1) |
θt], where V (at θt+1;u1) solves (27) (given u1). By the previous paragraph, it suffices to
prove that the payoff difference uˆ(1 θ)− uˆ(0 θ) increases in u1 for each θ ∈ {01}, which
follows if V (1 θ;u1)− V (0 θ;u1) increases in u1 for each θ ∈ {01}.
Differentiating (27) gives
∂
∂u1
V (at−1 θt;u1)= pˆ(1 | θt at−1)+ δE
[
∂
∂u1
V (at θt+1;u1)
∣∣∣ at−1 θt
]
 (30)
Letting d(at θt) := pˆ(at | θt1)− pˆ(at | θt0) and Δ(θt;u1) := V (1 θt;u1)−V (0 θt;u1),
(30) implies
∂
∂u1
Δ(θt;u1)= d(1 θt)+ δE
[
d(1 θt)
∂
∂u1
V (1 θt+1;u1)
∣∣∣ θt
]
+ δE
[
d(0 θt)
∂
∂u1
V (0 θt+1;u1)
∣∣∣ θt
]
= d(1 θt)+ δE
[
d(1 θt)
∂
∂u1
Δ(θt+1;u1)
∣∣∣ θt
]

where the last equality follows from the identity d(aθt)≡ −d(1 − aθt). Iterating gives
∂
∂u1
Δ(θt;u1)=
∞∑
t′=t
δt
′−tE
[
t′∏
t′′=t
d(1 θt′′)
∣∣∣ θt
]

By part 1 of the proposition, d(1 θt) > 0 for each θt , and hence ∂∂u1Δ(θt;u1) > 0. Q.E.D.
C.3. Response Times
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6: Since actions following any at−1 	= wt−1 are payoff-
irrelevant, the problem has a solution in which the agent acquires information only before
the first terminal action; that is, if σt−1(xt−1) 	= wt−1, then I(θ;xt | xt−1) = 0. We restrict
attention to solutions of this form.
Note that the system of constraints in (17) together with the preceding paragraph imply
E
[
I
(
θ;xt | xt−1
)]≤ κPr(σt−1(xt−1)=wt−1) for all t = 1     T
Taking partial sums gives
t∑
τ=1
E
[
I
(
θ;xτ | xτ−1
)]≤ κ t∑
τ=1
Pr
(
στ−1
(
xτ−1
)=wτ−1) for all t = 1    T
In addition, if at = σt(xt), then
t∑
τ=1
E
[
I
(
θ;aτ | aτ−1
)]= I(θ;at)≤ I(θ;xt)= t∑
τ=1
E
[
I
(
θ;xτ | xτ−1
)]

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Therefore, the value of the problem
max
p
E
[
T∑
t=1
ut
(
at θ
)]
s.t.
t∑
τ=1
E
[
I
(
θ;aτ | aτ−1
)]≤ κ t∑
τ=1
Pr
(
aτ−1 =wτ−1) for all t = 1     T
(31)
is an upper bound on the value of problem (17). Thus, if we find a choice rule p∗ solving
(31), and construct a strategy (fσ) feasible in (17) that generates p∗, then (fσ) solves
(17).
Since the set of choice rules satisfying the constraints in (31) is convex and the objective
is linear in p, the first-order conditions are sufficient for a global optimum. For each t, let
λ˜t ≥ 0 denote the shadow price of the constraint in (31) for t. Consider the problem
max
p
E
[
T∑
t=1
(
ut
(
at θ
)+ λt+1κ1at=wt − λtI(θ;at | at−1))
]
 (32)
where λT+1 = 0, and λt =∑Tτ=t λ˜τ for each t = 1    T . We will use Proposition 3 to find
a solution to (32) with λ1 = λ2 = · · · = λT = c/κ, and then show that, for a range of values
of c, this solution satisfies the first-order conditions for (31).
The only nontrivial decision node in each period t is at−1 =wt−1. Each of these nodes is
associated with a unique belief about θ, which, by symmetry, is the uniform belief. Sym-
metry also implies that, for each t, the continuation value Vt(wt−1 θ) is independent of θ;
accordingly, we omit the arguments of Vt . Multiplying the objective by κ/c to eliminate the
λt coefficient on the mutual information term and applying Proposition 3 implies that, at
each node wt−1, the solution corresponds to that of the static RI problem with a uniform
prior over θ and payoffs
uˆt(at θ)=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
κ/c if at = θ
0 if at = 1 − θ
κ(Vt+1 − c + κc/κ)/c if at =w
where VT+1 := 0. Note that the last expression simplifies to uˆt(wθ)= κVt+1/c.
We solve this static RI problem using Proposition 2. By symmetry, the rate rt satisfies
rt/2 = qt(0 |wt−1)= qt(1 |wt−1) for each t. By (7), the accuracy satisfies gt = exp(κ/c)1+exp(κ/c) for
each t.
Since action w is dominated at T by a uniform mixture of 0 and 1, rT = 1. By (12), the
value associated with the static RI problem at time T (including the rescaling by κ/c) is
κVT/c = log( 12(exp(κ/c)+ 1)). Proposition 2 implies that, for each t, rt solves
max
rt∈[01]
log
(
rt
2
(
exp(κ/c)+ 1)+ (1 − rt)exp(κVt+1/c)
)
 (33)
This problem is solved by any rt ∈ [01] if and only if κVt+1/c = log( 12(exp(κ/c)+ 1)), in
which case Vt = Vt+1. Proceeding recursively from period T back to period 1, it follows
that, for each r ∈ (01), there is a solution with r1 = · · · = rT−1 = r.
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For this to solve (31), r must be such that the constraints are satisfied. Note that, since
gt = exp(κ/c)1+exp(κ/c) for each t,
T∑
τ=1
E
[
I
(
θ;aτ | aτ−1
)]= I(θ;aT )= h(1/2)− h( exp(κ/c)
1 + exp(κ/c)
)

where h(p) := −p logp− (1 −p) log(1 −p). Since the constraint for period T in (31) is
binding, r must satisfy
h(1/2)− h
(
exp(κ/c)
1 + exp(κ/c)
)
= κ
T∑
τ=1
(1 − r)τ−1 (34)
The left-hand side of this equation is decreasing in c, while the right-hand side ranges
from κ to κT as r ranges from 1 to 0. By assumption, h(1/2) > κT , and hence there exist
c and c (whose values depend on κ) such that (34) has a solution r ∈ (01) whenever
c ∈ (c c). Since gt is constant, I(θ;at) = Pr(at 	= wt)κ∑Tτ=1(1 − r)τ−1 for each t, from
which it is straightforward to verify that the constraints in (31) hold for each period t < T .
In addition, because λt = λT for each t < T , the shadow price λ˜t of the constraint for
t is 0, and that of the binding constraint for T is positive. Therefore, the choice rule
corresponding to gt ≡ exp(κ/c)1+exp(κ/c) and rt ≡ r satisfying (34) solves (31).
All that remains is to construct a strategy (fσ) satisfying the system of constraints
in (17) that generates this choice rule. Without loss of generality, let 0, 1, w0, and w1
be distinct elements of X , and let W = {w0w1}. Let σ satisfy σt(xt) = xt if xt ∈ {01}
and σt(xt)=w if xt ∈W . Let the information strategy f satisfy Pr(xt = 0 | xt−1 ∈W t−1)=
Pr(xt = 1 | xt−1 ∈W t−1)= rt/2 and Pr(xt =w0 | xt−1 ∈W t−1)= Pr(xt =w1 | xt−1 ∈W t−1)=
(1 − rt)/2 for every t, and generate the following posteriors: if xt−1 ∈ W t−1 and xt = a ∈
{01}, then Pr(θ = a | xt) = g; and if xt−1 ∈ W t−1 and xt = wa for a ∈ {01}, then Pr(θ =
a | xt)= g˜t , where g˜t satisfies
h(1/2)− h(g˜t)= κ
T∑
τ=T−t+1
(1 − r)τ−1 (35)
Since g˜t is increasing and smaller than g for all t < T , there exists an information strategy
generating these posteriors. Equation (35) is equivalent to
(
h(1/2)− h(g˜t)
)
(1 − r)t + (1 − (1 − r)t)κ T∑
τ=1
(1 − r)τ−1 = κ
t∑
τ=1
(1 − r)τ−1
For t = 1, this together with (34) implies that the capacity constraint is binding. Proceed-
ing inductively, the constraint binds at every wt . Q.E.D.
REFERENCES
ARROW, K. J., D. BLACKWELL, AND M. A. GIRSHICK (1949): “Bayes and Minimax Solutions of Sequential
Decision Problems,” Econometrica, 17, 213–244. [539]
BALIGA, S., AND J. C. ELY (2011): “Mnemonomics: The Sunk Cost Fallacy as a Memory Kludge,” American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3 (4), 35–67. [522]
552 J. STEINER, C. STEWART, AND F. MATEˇJKA
CAPLIN, A., AND M. DEAN (2013): “The Behavioral Implications of Rational Inattention With Shannon En-
tropy,” Working Paper. [531,532,536,538]
COMPTE, O., AND P. JEHIEL (2007): “Auctions and Information Acquisition: Sealed Bid or Dynamic Formats?”
Rand Journal of Economics, 38 (2), 355–372. [524]
FUDENBERG, D., AND T. STRZALECKI (2015): “Dynamic Logit With Choice Aversion,” Econometrica, 83 (2),
651–691. [524]
FUDENBERG, D., P. STRACK, AND T. STRZALECKI (2015): “Stochastic Choice and Optimal Sequential Sam-
pling,” Working Paper. [539]
GOWRISANKARAN, G., AND M. RYSMAN (2012): “Dynamics of Consumer Demand for New Durable Goods,”
Journal of Political Economy, 120 (6), 1173–1219. [530]
HOBSON, A. (1969): “A New Theorem of Information Theory,” Journal of Statistical Physics, 1 (3), 383–391.
[523]
KENNAN, J., AND J. R. WALKER (2011): “The Effect of Expected Income on Individual Migration Decisions,”
Econometrica, 79 (1), 211–251. [530]
LIU, Q. (2011): “Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics,” Review of Economic Studies, 78 (4),
1400–1425. [524]
LUO, Y. (2008): “Consumption Dynamics Under Information Processing Constraints,” Review of Economic
Dynamics, 11 (2), 366–385. [524,536]
MAC´KOWIAK, B., AND M. WIEDERHOLT (2009): “Optimal Sticky Prices Under Rational Inattention,” American
Economic Review, 99 (3), 769–803. [524,536]
(2015): “Business Cycle Dynamics Under Rational Inattention,” Review of Economic Studies, 82 (4),
1502–1532. [524]
MAC´KOWIAK, B. A., F. MATEˇJKA, AND M. WIEDERHOLT (2016): “The Rational Inattention Filter,” CEPR
Discussion Paper 11237. [524]
MATEˇJKA, F. (2016): “Rationally Inattentive Seller: Sales and Discrete Pricing,” Review of Economic Studies,
83 (3), 1125–1155. [524]
MATEˇJKA, F., AND A. MCKAY (2015): “Rational Inattention to Discrete Choices: A New Foundation for the
Multinomial Logit Model,” American Economic Review, 105 (1), 272–298. [521,524,531]
MATTSSON, L.-G., AND J. W. WEIBULL (2002): “Probabilistic Choice and Procedurally Bounded Rationality,”
Games and Economic Behavior, 41 (1), 61–78. [522,524,533,534]
MOSCARINI, G. (2004): “Limited Information Capacity as a Source of Inertia,” Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 28 (10), 2003–2035. [536]
MOSCARINI, G., AND L. SMITH (2001): “The Optimal Level of Experimentation,” Econometrica, 69 (6), 1629–
1644. [523,524]
RAVID, D. (2014): “Bargaining With Rational Inattention,” Working Paper. [524,527]
RUBINSTEIN, A. (2007): “Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times,” The Economic
Journal, 117 (523), 1243–1259. [538]
RUST, J. (1987): “Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold Zurcher,”
Econometrica, 55 (5), 999–1033. [521,524,528-530]
SAMUELSON, W., AND R. ZECKHAUSER (1988): “Status quo Bias in Decision Making,” Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty, 1 (1), 7–59. [535]
SCHIRALDI, P. (2011): “Automobile Replacement: A Dynamic Structural Approach,” The RAND Journal of
Economics, 42 (2), 266–291. [530]
SIMS, C. A. (1998): “Stickiness,” Carnegie–Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 49, 317–356. [524]
(2003): “Implications of Rational Inattention,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 50 (3), 665–690. [521,
524,536,539]
SPILIOPOULOS, L., AND A. ORTMANN (2014): “The BCD of Response Time Analysis in Experimental Eco-
nomics,” Working Paper. [539]
STEINER, J., C. STEWART, AND F. MATEˇJKA (2015): “Rational Inattention Dynamics: Inertia and Delay in
Decision-Making,” CEPR Discussion Paper 10720. [537]
SUNDARESAN, S., AND S. TURBAN (2014): “Inattentive Valuation and Belief Polarization,” Working Pa-
per. [523]
TUTINO, A. (2013): “Rationally Inattentive Consumption Choices,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 16 (3),
421–439. [524]
WILSON, A. (2014): “Bounded Memory and Biases in Information Processing,” Econometrica, 82 (6), 2257–
2294. [536]
WOODFORD, M. (2009): “Information-Constrained State-Dependent Pricing,” Journal of Monetary Economics,
56, 100–124. [525]
RATIONAL INATTENTION DYNAMICS 553
(2014): “Stochastic Choice: An Optimizing Neuroeconomic Model,” American Economic Review, 104
(5), 495–500. [539]
CERGE-EI, a joint workplace of Charles University and the Economics Institute of the
Czech Academy of Sciences, Politických ve˘zn˘u 7, Prague, 111 21, Czech Republic, The Uni-
versity of Edinburgh, 30 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9JT, U.K., Center for Theoretical
Study, Charles University, Jilská 1, Prague, 110 00, Czech Republic, and The Czech Academy
of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic; jakub.steiner@cerge-ei.cz,
Department of Economics, University of Toronto, 150 St. George St., Toronto, ON M5S
3G7, Canada; colinbstewart@gmail.com,
and
CERGE-EI, a joint workplace of Charles University and the Economics Institute of
the Czech Academy of Sciences, Politických ve˘zn˘u 7, Prague, 111 21, Czech Republic;
filip.matejka@cerge-ei.cz.
Co-editor Joel Sobel handled this manuscript.
Manuscript received 14 July, 2015; final version accepted 3 October, 2016; available online 3 October, 2016.
